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Abstract 
I compare the relative merits of a policy of inflation targeting for small open economies with 
frictions in financial markets with an alternative floating regime that has a constant rate of 
domestic money growth. The differences between these two policies appear only in the dynamic 
properties of equilibria with credit rationing. 
When the probability of loan repayment is low, inflation targeting  eliminates endogenous 
volatility when compared with a constant money growth, but equilibria remain indeterminate. 
When the probability of loan repayment is high, inflation targeting always improves on the 
stability of equilibria, and sometimes it also eliminates endogenous fluctuations. 
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1  Introduction 
In this paper I argue that when the nominal exchange rate is left to float and, of course, there is no intervention 
of the monetary authority in the market for foreign exchange (dirty floating), alternative monetary targets may 
imply different de facto exchange rate regimes. The differences among these alternative de facto exchange rate 
regimes are concerned with the very important issues of stability and the vulnerability of equilibria to volatility. 
Among the monetary targets that are most frequently discussed we find inflation targeting and the targeting of 
the rate of domestic money growth. I show that there are, in reality, different ways of allowing the nominal 
exchange rate to float and that, not surprisingly, the differences arise from different monetary targets. 
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It is well-known that the study of alternative methods of achieving price stability, in the context of an 
open economy, is intimately related to the issue of the relative merits of alternative exchange rate regimes. In the 
past decade, economies open to international capital flows
1 have been -and still are- in the process of moving 
away from adjustable pegs (e.g. crawling pegs), some toward harder pegs (e.g., currency boards or arrangements 
with no separate legal tender), but more towards systems with greater exchange rate flexibility. Among the Latin 
American countries classified as emerging market economies, the spectrum goes from Argentina and, more 
recently, Ecuador with very hard pegs to Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Perú with independent floats; Venezuela 
seems to be the only country with an intermediate peg
2. Many of the recent converts have opted for an inflation-
targeting approach
3. Moreover, inflation targeting serves as a monetary policy framework in several advanced 
economies
4. What is the rationale for choosing such a monetary target? Does it really make a difference and 
how? 
The evidence does not appear to support a particular exchange rate regime and, thus, whether is better to 
fix or to float is still an open issue.
5 The answer to this question becomes even more complex when frictions in 
financial intermediation are considered
6. In this context, the analysis of alternative ways of conducting monetary 
policy with floating exchange rates (i.e., “how to float”) when important financial market frictions are present 
seems to be equally important. In particular, inflation targeting seems to be a promising alternative once a 
country decides to let the exchange rate float.
 7 
Inflation targeting can be defined as a framework for conducting monetary policy  under floating 
exchange rates that commits the Central Bank to targeting and achieving low inflation. Masson, Savastano and 
Sharma (1997) identified two prerequisites for a successful inflation targeting framework: first, the ability to 
carry out a substantially independent monetary policy, especially one not constrained by fiscal considerations; 
second, the freedom from commitment to another nominal anchor like the exchange rate or wages. Given the 
                                                 
1 Mostly, economies classified as developed or emerging markets by the IMF. See Fischer (2001). 
2 See Fischer (2001). 
3 See Fischer (2001). 
4 See Masson, Savastano and Sharma (1997), and Croce and Khan (2000). 
5 See Bencivenga, Huybens and Smith (2002), and Calvo and Reinhard (2002). 
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long histories of high inflation rates in most Latin American countries as well as the presence of independent 
central banks after their stabilization programs
8, these countries constitute an interesting environment in which 
to study the results of implementing such a policy. This paper evaluates the relative merits of inflation targeting 
using a dynamic general equilibrium model with micro foundations, in contrast with most of the previous 
literature. 
In this paper I examine a small open economy where a floating exchange rate regime operates together 
with a policy of inflation targeting
9 and compare it with a model economy identical in every respect except the 
fact that there is a policy of a constant rate of domestic money growth. I use the model developed in Hernandez-
Verme ( 2003,  2004). This model captures several characteristics of Latin American countries after their 
stabilization processes: a small open economy  where domestic lending is subject to multiple and currency-
specific reserve requirements that are binding. In this economy, financial intermediaries perform a real 
allocative function in the presence of an adverse selection problem in credit markets.
10 This friction may cause 
credit to be rationed or not in equilibrium, in order  for financial intermediaries  to induce self-selection. 
Interestingly, the severity of this friction in the credit markets is endogenous in the following sense: the 
domestic rate of inflation, through its affect on the interest rate on loans, has a strong effect on the extent to 
which credit is rationed and, thus, on financial depth. In addition, there are no legal restrictions either on the use 
of foreign currency or on investing abroad. 
The merits of a policy of floating exchange rates with a constant rate of domestic money growth in the 
environment just described have been discussed extensively in Hernandez-Verme (2003, 2004). In this paper, I 
also consider explicitly the following policy in the same context: the monetary authority exogenously
11 sets a 
target for the domestic inflation rate once and for all, while leaving the nominal exchange rate to float. Thus, the 
                                                 
8 See Chang and Velasco (2000a). 
9 See Smith (1994) for a model for a closed economy with inflation targeting. 
10 See Azariadis and Smith (1996) for a simpler version in a closed economy without reserve requirements. 
11 In this paper, I do not address explicitly the issue of how this target is chosen. However, the results of the analysis will, 
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monetary authority injects (withdraws) as much domestic currency as needed every period, so that the 
inflationary target is met.
12 
Not surprisingly, I find that the steady-state equilibria under a policy of floating exchange rates with 
inflation targeting are identical to the corresponding equilibria under a floating exchange rate regime with a 
constant rate of domestic money growth
13. I find that changes in domestic inflation and world (U.S.) inflation 
affect the domestic capital stock differently according to whether credit is rationed or not. Credit rationing tends 
to be observed when domestic rates of inflation are low, or else the scope for credit to be rationed depends in a 
relatively complicated way on the target for domestic inflation. The first situation will emerge when the 
probability of repaying a loan is relatively high while the second will arise when the probability of repayment is 
sufficiently low. 
Under both policies, in situations where the probability of repaying loans is high, moderate increases in 
the inflation rate stimulate output and lead to financial deepening when credit is rationed (inflation is initially 
low), but reduce output and financial depth when there is no credit rationing (inflation is initially high). Thus, 
whether the target is the inflation rate or the rate of domestic money growth
14, there will be inflation thresholds 
as observed empirically
15. Inflation and output are positively (negatively) correlated below (above) the 
threshold. I must mention that in situations where the probability of repaying loans is high, increases in inflation 
are always detrimental to growth and, consequently, there are no inflation thresholds. 
When equilibrium dynamics are considered,  however,  I find  significant differences between the 
alternative monetary policies, especially when credit is rationed. There are bifurcations strongly associated with 
the value of the monetary policy parameters, i.e. the target inflation rate and the rate of domestic money growth. 
In  economies where the probability of repaying loans is high,  a policy of inflation targeting eliminates 
                                                 
12 Notice that, given its internal design and the nature of the environment, the policies that I discuss are credible, sustainable 
and implementable by an independent monetary authority. 
13 Of course, whenever the target for inflation, under the first policy, is equal to the rate of domestic money creation under 
the second policy. 
14 See Hernandez-Verme (2004). 
15 See Bullard and Keating (1995), Khan and Senhadji (2001), and Drukker, Gomis-Porqueras and Hernandez-Verme 
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fluctuations and improves on the stability of equilibria for all levels of inflation.
16 However, in economies where 
the probability of repaying loans is low and there is credit rationing, the dynamic properties of equilibria are 
very similar to the ones observed under a constant rate of domestic money growth when the inflation rate is low. 
For higher inflation rates, a policy of inflation targeting eliminates economic fluctuations. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the environment. This 
economy shares the main s tylized characteristics of the Peruvian and Argentinean economies after their 
stabilizations
17, as well as of several other Latin American economies. Section 3 considers the conditions for a 
general equilibrium under the alternative policies. Section 4 describes steady state equilibria obtained from the 
alternative policies under study, as well as the conditions under which credit rationing may be observed. Section 
5 presents the dynamic systems resulting from each of the policies considered and describes the equilibrium 
dynamics. Finally, Section 6 presents the main conclusions of the analysis. 
 
2  The Environment 
In this section, I briefly present the basic model from Hernandez-Verme (2004). Consider a small open economy 
consisting of an infinite sequence of two-period lived, overlapping generations. Time is discrete and indexed by 
t=0, 1, 2,... In each generation there is a continuum of agents with unit mass, and they can be of two types: Type 
1 agents comprise a fraction l˛(0,1) of the population, while the remaining fraction (1-l) consists of Type 2 
agents. 
There is a single tradable final good each period.  ( ) N K F ,  units of the good are produced using both 
physical capital  ( ) K  and labor  ( ) N .  () ￿ F  is a constant returns to scale production function available to both 
types of agents, and  ( ) 1 , ) ( k F k f ”  denotes the intensive production function, with k being the capital-labor 
                                                 
16 In some circumstances, though, dynamic equilibria can be indeterminate. 
17 And, of course, before the Argentinean crisis of 2000. These stylized characteristics can also represent several other Latin 
American economies.   6 
ratio,  N K k ” .  () ￿ f  is a smooth, increasing, concave function such that  ( ) 0 0 = f ;  capital depreciates 
completely in the production process. 
All agents are risk neutral and care about consumption of the final good only in the final period of life. 
There is no disutility from labor and thus, agents supply labor inelastically. 
Table 1 displays the patterns of endowments as well as the access to different technologies. Type 1 
agents are “natural” lenders and Type 2 agents are “natural” borrowers. In addition to young agents, there is an 
initial old generation at t=0. These agents are all endowed with one unit of labor and  0 K >0 units of physical 
capital. No other agents have an initial endowment of capital, nor are any agents endowed with the final good. 
There are two technologies available in the economy for transferring resources between periods. One of 
these technologies is a pure storage technology whereby one unit of the good stored at t returns x>0 units of 
consumption at t+1. x should be thought of as relatively small, so that the storage technology is not productive. 
The second is an investment technology that transforms one unit of the final good at t into one unit of physical 
capital at t+1. Access to these technologies by each type of agent is displayed in Table 1. Only old agents who 
receive capital from their investment can hire young labor and produce the final good. Moreover, to further 
simplify the environment, there are no rental markets for capital. Once physical capital is obtained, old Type 2 
agents can combine their own labor with labor they hire from young Type 1 agents, and produce the final good. 
Again, purely for simplicity, old Type 2 agents are assumed to work only for themselves. 
2.1  Informational Structure 
At the beginning of each period, each agent knows h er own type. However, the agent's type is private 
information. Also, p  is known by all agents, but a Type 1 agent does not know yet whether, if she invests, her 
investment will yield capital or not. Since Type 2 agents are natural borrowers, having access to a productive 
investment technology but no young period income, this private information gives rise to a conventional adverse 
selection problem in credit markets. 
In addition, if they obtain credit, later in the period a young Type 1 agent learns whether or not she can 
productively invest in physical capital. This information is also private to the agent. However, age and all   7 
market transactions (like working, making deposits in or borrowing from the financial system) are observable. 
The activity of storing goods does not require market transactions, and, therefore, storage activity is 
unobservable. 
Given the structure of information, young Type 2 agents cannot credibly claim to be of Type 1 and 
supply labor when young. However, young Type 1 agents can credibly claim to be of Type 2 by not supplying 
labor, borrowing the same amount that young Type 2 agents do. However, only a fraction p of Type 1 agents 
have the ability to create physical capital. The remaining fraction cannot operate the production process when 
old, since they would then be discovered as having misrepresented their type. I assume that they can be punished 
prohibitively. Consequently, the fraction (1-p) of young Type 1 agents who obtain credit will avoid punishment 
only if they “abscond” with their loan. They can do so by taking any credit received when young, investing in 
the storage technology, and “going underground” when old
18. The agents both escape punishment, and avoid 
repaying  their loan. Finally, notice that Type 2 agents have no access to the storage technology and, 
consequently, they choose never to abscond. 
2.2  Trading and Financial Intermediation 
Several types of trade can take place in this economy. Old producers can hire labor from young Type 1 agents at 
the competitive real wage, wt. Type 1 agents who work when young save all of their labor income; saving can 
take two forms: loans to domestic agents claiming to be of Type 2 in the amount of  t d  goods, or saving abroad 
in the amount of 
*
t i  goods.
19 All domestic lending is intermediated, and domestic financial intermediaries offer 
only one type of deposits. Thus,  t d  denotes deposits. 
There is free entry into the domestic activity of intermediation. Rt denotes the gross real interest rate 
offered on deposits by domestic financial intermediaries between t and t+1, and rt the gross real interest rate 
charged on loans made at t and maturing at t+1.  1 > r  denotes the number of goods received at t+1 per unit of 
                                                 
18  x could also be regarded as representing t he punishment incurred after misrepresenting one's type and taking an 
unproductive loan. 
19 Such investments could also be thought of as cross-border deposits. See Baliño, Benner and Borensztein (1999).   8 
the good saved abroad at t, i.e. r is the gross international real interest rate which is assumed constant over time, 
for the sake of simplicity. Given that the domestic economy is small, no events in the domestic economy 
influence r. Also notice that the storage technology not being productive implies that  x Rt >  and  x r > . 
Two types of currency  may  circulate in the domestic economy. One is issued by the domestic 
government. Let Mt be the outstanding stock of domestic currency at t, and pt denote the domestic price level. In 
addition, foreign currency may circulate in the domestic economy.  Let  Qt denote the outstanding stock of 
foreign currency in the domestic country, while 
*
t p  denotes the price level in the rest of the world. et denotes 
the market determined nominal exchange rate at t, defined as units of domestic currency required to purchase a 
unit of foreign currency at t. The law of one price (purchasing power parity, since there is a single good) implies 
that  t t t p p e =
* , for all t. 
All domestic lending is subject to the financial regulations of the domestic country. It is assumed that all 
agents lending domestically must hold currency reserves. Some of these reserves must be held in the form of 
domestic currency, and some in the form of foreign currency.
20 fd˛(0,1) is the fraction of deposits that must be 










 when held from t to 
t+1. ff˛(0,1) is the fraction of deposits that must be held in the form of foreign currency; these reserves yield the 



























 when held between t and t+1. Notice that both  d f  and  f f  are 
parameters chosen exogenously by the economic authority in the domestic country. Positive lending by the 
financial system will require assuming that 1 < + f d f f . I will focus on the situation where both reserves 
                                                 
20 This model is not rich enough as to allow naturally for more than one type of deposits, and that the loss in tractability 
from including the possibility of more than one type of deposits in the domestic financial system would be significant. 
However, in the countries that I focus on, some deposits can be denominated in foreign currency and the reserves required 
for these deposits must be held in foreign currency. I incorporate these characteristics in the model by introducing multiple 
currency-specific reserve requirements in spite of the fact that there is a single type of deposits. See Baliño, Benner and 
Borensztein (1999) for more details.   9 
























<r both hold, so that (net) nominal rates 
of interest are positive both domestically and in the rest of the world. Clearly, in contexts like Latin America, the 
assumption of binding reserve requirements is a highly relevant one. 
Free entry into intermediation implies that domestic intermediaries earn zero profits in equilibrium. This 












































  (1) 
Equation (1) asserts that the weighted average of a lender's returns on loans, domestic currency reserves, 
and foreign currency reserves must equal the gross real rate of interest on deposits. 
2.3  Agents’ Behavior and Loan Contracts 
Let bt denote the real value borrowed at t by young agents claiming to be of Type 2. tt is the real value of a 
lump-sum transfer given at t by the government to young agents claiming to be of Type 2; this is the mechanism 
used by the monetary authority to inject or withdraw domestic currency. In an unpublished appendix, I discuss 
alternative mechanisms of money-injection. These agents invest in physical capital all the resources they obtain 
in youth, and each (successful) old agent who claimed to be of Type 2 at time t will have a capital stock at t+1 
equal to 
t t t b K t + = +1 . (2) 
In addition, at t+1, Type 2 agents combine  1 + t K  with their own unit of labor, plus Lt+1 units of labor they hire 









, and recall that   10 
( ) t t k w w =  denotes the real wage at t per unit of labor.
 21 Finally, these agents repay their loans. Therefore, the 
consumption of an old Type 2 agent born at t, c2,t+1, can be written as 




1 , 2 + + + + + + - = .  (3) 
It follows that Type 2 agents will be willing to take loans only when  t t k f r ‡ + ) ( 1
' . 
I seek a separating equilibrium in credit markets where only young Type 2 agents obtain credit, since 
lending to young Type 1 agents is unprofitable. In equilibrium, domestic lenders must design loan contracts that 
channel funds only to natural borrowers and prevent Type 1 agents from misrepresenting their type. Thus loan 
contracts must i nduce self-selection
22. As derived in  Hernandez-Verme (2004), competition among lenders 
implies that contractual loan terms, rt and bt, must be chosen to maximize the expected utility (consumption) of 
Type 2 agents, subject to the zero profit condition (1) and the self-selection constraint given by  




t t t t t t t t t t b x k f b k f ri d R t p t r p + - + + - ‡ + + +   (4) 
That is, ( ) t t b , r  maximizes c2,t+1, subject to (1) and (4), taking tt, wt+1, Rt, pt, pt+1, 
*
t p  and 
*
1 + t p  as given. As I 
have already noted, this problem has a nontrivial solution if and only if  ( ) t t k f r ‡ ¢ +1 . If  ( ) t t k f r = ¢ +1 , Type 2 
agents are indifferent about the loan quantity they receive; in such an equilibrium, loan quantities must simply 
be such that marginal product of capital equals the loan rate. This outcome is what would be expected in the 
absence of private information: the adverse selection problem is non-binding. I refer to this as a Walrasian 
outcome. Alternatively, if  ( ) t t k f r > ¢ +1 , Type 2  agents would like to borrow arbitrarily large amounts. 
However, excessive lending would violate the self-selection constraint. Hence Type 2 agents experience credit 
rationing, and the loan quantity bt is determined by the self-selection constraint (4) at equality. I refer to this as a 
Credit Rationing outcome. 
 
                                                 
21 This means that the capital-labor ratio is a function of the real wage. As in Hernandez-Verme (2004),  ( ) t t w w k
1 - = . To 
simplify the exposition here, I write the relevant expressions in terms of  1 + t k  whenever possible. 
22 See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) -or, in a more closely related environment, Azariadis and Smith (1996)- for a proof 
that the only nontrivial equilibrium in this economy induces agents to self-select.   11 
2.4  Market Clearing and Aggregate Consistency Conditions 
There are several additional conditions which must be satisfied in a full general equilibrium. There are no 
restrictions on international capital flows, implying that rates of return on alternative ways of saving must be 
equated. Hence, 
. r Rt =    (5) 













l f = , (7) 
since a fraction l of domestic agents are of Type 1, and hence are savers. Additionally, the market for loans 
clears when supply equals demand: 
( ) ( )   . 1 1 t t f d b d l l f f - = - -   (8) 
Finally, from the budget constraint faced by a young Type 1 agent we obtain 
( ) t t t d k w i - =
*  (9) 
(that is, net investment abroad equals domestic savings less domestic deposits). 
In credit markets, four conditions must be satisfied in equilibrium. First, banks earn zero profits so that 
(1) holds. Second,  ( ) t t k f r ‡ ¢ +1  must hold. Third, the self-selection constraint (4) must be satisfied. Fourth, (5) 
must hold. 
In the next section, I describe situations where Walrasian and Credit Rationed equilibria emerge as 
outcomes under alternative monetary policies: a constant rate of money growth and inflation targeting. 
 
   12 
3.  Alternative Targets of Monetary Policy 
I now present and describe the general equilibrium outcomes under two alternative targets of monetary policy: a 
constant rate of money growth and inflation targeting. Notice that in this paper I assume that the monetary 
authority does not hold a reserve position to “back” the money supply and it does not interfere in the market of 
foreign exchange: there is no “dirty” floating. This model could be extended to allow for a reserve position. This 
paper does not consider this extension. 
To simplify notation, I will use the same variable s to denote both the target rate of money growth and 
the target rate of inflation. Of course the policy rules implied by which variable is targeted will be different. 
3.1 Targeting the rate of domestic money growth 
Suppose the monetary authority sets the rate of domestic money growth s once and for all, so that the supply of 
domestic currency evolves according to 
( ) . 0 , 1 1 ‡ " + = + t M M t t s   (10) 
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s   (12) 
Defining  1 + ” t t K b e  as the fraction of the capital stock per producer that is financed with loans from the 
domestic financial system
23, I can write the main equilibrium conditions under this policy compactly as 
                                                 
23 Note that  ( )( )
( ) ( ) f f d
f d
f s f f
f f s
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1  must hold for lending to be positive, where  e s  is such 
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k w i   (15) 
Equation (13) asserts that the marginal product of capital must weakly exceed the rate of interest on 
loans. (14) is the self-selection condition in credit markets, and (15) describes net foreign investment. Note that 
one of the conditions (13) or (14) must hold as an equality. If (14) is an equality, credit is rationed. 
3.2 Targeting the inflation rate 






























   (16) 
Equation (16) is a direct result of the binding reserve requirements, and holds always when the nominal 
exchange rate is left to float. (16) is extremely helpful in illustrating the main differences between the alternative 
















.  (17) 
Under a policy of inflation targeting, the monetary authority sets a target for the domestic inflation rate and 
withdraws/injects domestic currency accordingly in order to meet this target, given the state variables { } t t d d , 1 -  








   (18)   14 
Combining (16) with (18) and solving for the supply of domestic currency at  t, I obtain that the 
domestic stock of money evolves endogenously according to 
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M M - -
= - t l   (20) 
The fiscal policies described by equations (11) and (19) have two important features. Because the lump-
sum transfers are given to young agents claiming to be of Type 2, this policy does not affect capital formation 
per se in a full-information environment (Walrasian environment). However, it does affect the self-selection 
constraint and thus capital formation when credit is rationed. Therefore, considering different ways of 
redistributing the lump-sum transfers might lead to different results.  Alternatives are discussed in an 
unpublished appendix. 
The main equilibrium conditions under a policy of inflation targeting can be written compactly as 
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[ ] { } , ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 1
'
t t t t t k x k f k w r t l pr pr p p l - + - - + ‡ - + +   (22) 
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where 
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”  (25)   15 
Equation (21) says that the marginal product of capital must weakly exceed the interest rate on loans for 
Type 2 agents to be willing to take loans. Equation ( 22) is the self-selection constraint in credit markets. 
Equation (23) is the government budget constraint and equation (24) is the aggregate resources constraint. Note 
that one of the conditions (21) or (22) must hold as an equality. If (21) holds as an equality, the equilibrium is 
Walrasian. If (22) holds as an equality, credit is rationed. 
As in Hernandez-Verme (2004), in order to obtain sharp characterizations of equilibria with and without 
credit rationing, I assume that the production function has the Cobb-Douglas form  ( ) 1 , 0   , ) (
' ˛ = a
a Ak k f . In 
addition, for simplicity, I also assume that the rest of the world has a constant rate of inflation equal to its 
constant (net) rate of money creation, s
*. Thus, 
( )














  (26) 
Notice that (1), (17) and (26) imply that under a policy of inflation targeting the interest rate on loans is 
a constant, given by 





































r r   (27) 
In the next section I proceed to the analysis of steady-state equilibria. The analysis of dynamic equilibria 
will be taken up in Section 5. 
 
4  Steady-State Equilibria 
Steady-state equilibria will be characterized by allocations in which the triplet { }
* , , i k t  is constant. I analyze 
Walrasian and Credit Rationing regimes separately. 
4.1  Steady-State Equilibria in a Walrasian Regime 
In this section I derive the conditions necessary to show that Walrasian outcomes with a policy of inflation 
targeting have the same steady-state properties as Walrasian outcomes with a constant rate of money growth.   16 
A steady-state Walrasian equilibrium implies  ( ) r = k f
' , and a non-binding self-selection constraint. 
Let  k ˆ,  t ˆ , and 
* ˆ i  denote, respectively, the steady-state capital-labor ratio, investment subsidy, and net 
investment abroad in a Walrasian regime. Using (13), we find the steady-state capital-labor ratio under a policy 




































































k   (28) 
Notice that we obtain the same expression for k ˆ when using equation (21) instead, under a policy of inflation 
targeting. Thus, k ˆ  is the same under both monetary rules, provided that the inflation target and the target for 
money growth are equal. In addition, either (20) or (23) yield the same government budget constraint in the 
steady-state equilibrium 
, ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ k e t - =   (29) 
Finally, combining either (15) or (24) with (29) yields the same 














- - =   (30) 
Thus, Walrasian steady-state equilibria are identical under either one of the monetary policies considered, 
provided that the inflation target and the money growth target are equal. At this point it is useful to define the 
total fraction of savings invested abroad (denoted by  c ˆ ) as an additional variable of interest. It is clear that  c ˆ  
is given by 
.


















  (31)   17 
The main results are as a follows
24: an increase in either the domestic or the foreign rate of inflation 
lowers the return that domestic financial intermediaries receive on their currency reserves. As a result, the rate 
of interest on loans must increase in order for domestic banks to compete for deposits in world markets. When 
the private information problem does not bind, higher inflation rates increase the real interest rate on loans and 
lead to a reduction in domestic capital investment. Interestingly, a similar effect is observed when either  d f  or 
f f  are increased by the monetary authority: the interest rate on loans must increase with the subsequent 
reduction of domestic capital investment, k ˆ. 
Aggregate welfare analysis is extremely complicated in this model due to the heterogeneity of agents. I 
will focus on welfare results for individual Types. With respect to the welfare implications of higher inflation 
rates, natural lenders (Type 1 agents) are always worse-off with higher inflation rates, either domestic or 
foreign, because by increasing the real interest rate on loans they reduce the domestic capital stock, which then 
reduces the natural lenders’ labor income. On the other hand, a higher domestic inflation rate will have an 
ambiguous effect on the welfare of the natural borrowers (Type 2): with higher domestic inflation, the real 
interest rate on loans increases, reducing welfare; but at the same time higher domestic inflation increases the 
subsidy rate received by Type 2 agents, thus increasing welfare. Aditionally, a higher world inflation rate does 
not affect the subsidy rate received by Type 2 agents but it increases the real interest rate on loans, reducing the 
natural borrowers’ welfare. The sign of the net change in welfare for Type 2 agents is ambiguous. Aggregate 
welfare analysis depends on the relative magnitude of the losses and gains, as well as the distribution of Type 1 
and Type 2 agents. 
4.2  Steady-State Equilibria with Credit Rationing 
In this section, I derive the conditions necessary to show that the credit-rationing equilibria with a policy of 
inflation targeting have the same steady-state properties as credit-rationing outcomes with a constant rate of 
money growth, provided that the targets are equal. 
                                                 
24 For more detail, see Propositions 1, 2 and 3 in Hernandez-Verme (2003).   18 
A steady-state equilibrium with C redit Rationing  implies  ( ) r > k f
'  and  a binding self-selection 
constraint. Let  k
~
, t ~  and  c ~denote, respectively, the steady-state capital-labor ratio, investment subsidy and 
ratio of investment abroad to savings in a Credit Rationing regime. When credit is rationed in a steady-state 
equilibrium with a constant rate of money growth, equation (14) holds with equality and determines the capital-
labor ratio. Notice that under a policy of inflation targeting, the capital-labor ratio is determined by the 
corresponding self-selection constraint (22) holding with equality. Either (14) or (22) yield the same expression 
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From (32) it follows that equation (11) and equation (23) will determine that t ~  is identical under both policies 
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Using either (15) or (24) yields the same expression for  : ~ c  
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  (34) 
where 
* ~ i  denotes investment abroad in a steady-state equilibrium with Credit Rationing. 
The steady-state equilibria with credit rationing are identical under either a policy of constant money 
growth or inflation targeting, provided that the targets are equal. Now I present the main characteristics of these 
equilibria.
25 
Two cases may arise depending upon whether the probability of repaying loans is high enough, i.e. 







 or not. Henceforth, I refer to the situation with high probability of repayment as 
Case 1, while Case 2 will be the opposite. 
                                                 
25 For more detail, see Propositions 4, 5 and 6 in Hernandez-Verme (2003).   19 
First, when credit is rationed, increases in the domestic inflation rate and in the world inflation rate will 
affect the domestic capital stock differently. This is the case because the self-selection constraints (14) and (22) 
are affected differently by changes in domestic and foreign inflation. However, in a Walrasian equilibrium, 
changes in the domestic and foreign inflation have qualitatively similar effects. 
Second, it is also the case that changes in the domestic rate of inflation can have very different effects 
under credit rationing than they do in a Walrasian equilibrium. Once again, this happens because what matters is 
how the self-selection constraint is affected by changes in the domestic rate of inflation. Higher domestic 
inflation can relax the self-selection constraint by increasing the interest rate on loans and, in this way, reducing 
the incentives of Type 1 agents to misrepresent their type. Whether or not higher rates of domestic inflation have 
this effect depends on the probability of a Type 1 agent actually repaying a loan if it is taken (i.e., it depends on 
the magnitude of p). In a Case 1 economy, increases in domestic inflation increase capital, while the opposite 
occurs in a Case 2 economy. 
With respect to the welfare implications of higher inflation rates when credit is rationed, notice that 
because domestic and foreign inflation affect the self-selection constraint differently, they will also affect 
domestic agents differently. Higher domestic inflation, under a Case 1 scenario, increases the real interest rate 
on loans and the subsidy rate, relaxing the self-selection constraint and leading, in this way, to a higher domestic 
capital stock when credit. A higher domestic capital stock will result in a higher labor income for natural lenders 
(Type 1 agents), resulting in higher welfare for these agents. However, the natural borrowers (Type 2 agents) 
will be better-off only under very special conditions because there are two forces working in opposite directions: 
higher domestic inflation increases output and the subsidy rate, implying higher welfare for natural borrowers; 
but a higher domestic inflation rate also increases the real interest rate on loans, resulting in lower welfare for 
these agents.
26 
                                                 
26 It can be shown that, when Case 1 obtains, Type 2 agents (natural borrowers) will be better-off with a higher domestic 
inflation rate if and only if  [ ] { }
a erp a l a l ap
- > - - - + - -
1 2 ~
) 1 )( 1 (( 1 ) 1 )( 1 ( k r A . The welfare results when Case 
2 obtains are available upon request.   20 
On the other hand, higher world inflation rates increase only the real interest rate on loans (the subsidy 
rate remains unchanged), leading to a lower domestic capital stock. A lower capital stock will result in a lower 
labor income for natural lenders (Type 1 agents), resulting in lower welfare for these agents. However, Type 2 
agents will also be adversely affected by higher foreign inflation only under very special conditions because 
there are two forces working in opposite directions: a higher world inflation rate reduces output and, therefore, it 
also reduces welfare for the natural borrowers; at the same time, even though the real interest rate on loans is 
higher, the total amount that has to be repaid could be reduced because of the lower capital stock
27, increasing 
welfare. 
Notice that  because domestic inflation has the opposite effects on the domestic capital stock in 
Walrasian outcomes than it does under credit rationing, the effects of higher domestic inflation on the natural 
borrowers’ welfare in Walrasian outcomes are also reversed under credit rationing, when Case 1 o ccurs. 
However, a higher world inflation rate always leads to a lower domestic capital stock, either with credit 
rationing or in Walrasian outcomes. Thus higher world inflation always reduces the natural lenders’ welfare 
when Case 1 occurs. 
4.3  When Does Credit Rationing Occur? 
I have shown in the previous subsections that the steady state equilibria with a policy of inflation targeting 
replicate the steady state equilibria with a policy of constant money growth, provided that both targets are equal. 
In this section I describe when credit rationing does and does not occur, in a steady-state equilibrium. As noted 
in Hernandez-Verme (2003 and 2004), whether credit is rationed or not in equilibrium will depend on the 
domestic and foreign inflation rates and on the world real interest rate. 
                                                 
27 It can be shown that, when Case 1 obtains, natural borrowers will be worse-off with a higher world inflation rate if and 
only if  [ ] { }
a erp a l a l ap
- > - - - + - -
1 2 ~
) 1 )( 1 (( 1 ) 1 )( 1 ( k r A . The welfare results when Case 2 obtains are 
available upon request.   21 
The interest rate on loans  r  is always a monotonically increasing and concave function of the steady-
state domestic inflation rate, for all the economically meaningful rates of inflation
28. Therefore, we can rewrite 
r  as  ( ) s r .  ( ) s r  has the configuration depicted in Figures 1 and 2. 
Notice again that  the  steady-state equilibria display credit rationing if  r > ) (
' k f , while  no credit 
rationing  exists  when  ( ) r = ¢ k f .  Credit  rationing,  when  r > ) (
' k f  holds,  depends on assumptions on 
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. When Case 1 o ccurs,  ( ) k f
~ ' is a monotonically decreasing function of  s. 








,  ( ) k f
~ '  decreases and, typically, converges to a small 
and positive number. Thus we have the situation depicted in Figure 1. Credit is rationed iff s<sc holds. 
When Case 1 occurs, if the initial domestic rate of inflation is fairly low, increases in the domestic rate 
of inflation (that is, increases in s) can be used to stimulate capital formation and long-run output
29. However, 
there is a strict limit to the extent to which domestic inflation can be used for this purpose. Once s>sc, the 
equilibrium will be Walrasian, and further increases in the domestic money growth rate will have adverse 
consequences for long-run real activity
30. Thus there will exist inflation thresholds, as we observe empirically. 
In the closed economy version of this model, by  Azariadis and Smith (1996), credit was rationed for high 
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r
. In a Case 2 economy,  ( ) k f
~ ' can be shown to be an increasing, concave function 
of s. As a result, several possibilities arise regarding the existence of steady states where credit is rationed. The 
possibilities are illustrated by Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c. 
                                                 
















29 This is consistent with evidence reported by Bullard and Keating (1995) and Khan and Senhadji (2001) that, at low rates 
of inflation, moderate increases in the rate of inflation can increase the long-run level of real activity. 
30 This is consistence with evidence that, at high enough rates of inflation, further increases in inflation have detrimental 
effects on the level of long-run activity. Again, see Bullard and Keating (1995) or Khan and Senhadji (2001).   22 
Figure 2a. For high (low) values of the domestic inflation rate, credit is (is not) rationed. This situation tends to 
transpire when x is relative large. 
Figure 2b. For rates of money creation below sL or for rates of money creation above sH, credit is not rationed. 
Credit is rationed iff s˛(sL,sH). 
Figure 2c.  ( ) s r  lies everywhere above  ( ) k f
~ ' . This situation tends to arise when x is relatively small. 
In a Case 2 economy, the scope for credit to be rationed may depend in a relatively complicated way on 
the rate of inflation. In particular, the “bindingness” of informational asymmetries need not depend 
monotonically on the target rate of inflation. This result also differs from Azariadis and Smith (1996). 
Due to the fact that the steady-state equilibria under a policy of inflation targeting are identical to the 
steady-state equilibria under a policy of floating with a constant money growth, it is not surprising that the 
conditions under which credit rationing occurs are also similar between these two policies. 
 
5  Dynamic Equilibria 
5.1  Dynamic Systems in a Walrasian Regime 
In this section, I compare the potential differences in equilibrium dynamics resulting from floating with 
alternative monetary targets by the Central Banks when credit is not rationed. 
5.1.1 Walrasian dynamics with a constant rate of money growth 
The dynamic Walrasian system is given by (13) with equality and (15). (14) holds as a strict inequality. As in 
Hernandez-Verme (2004), (13) governs completely the dynamic behavior of the capital-labor ratio, and the only 
nontrivial equilibrium is the steady state equilibrium. The economy attains the steady-state after one period, by 
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5.1.2 Walrasian dynamics with inflation targeting 
The dynamic system in a Walrasian regime is given by (21) with equality, (23) and (24). In addition, (22) holds 
as an inequality. (21) holding with equality implies that the capital-labor ratio is always at the steady-state level 
k ˆ. Therefore, the dynamic system in a Walrasian regime can be rewritten as 
,     , ˆ
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and 
( ) t k x k A r rt l p p a l
a ) 1 ( ˆ 1 ˆ ) 1 )( 1 ( - + - > - -  (38) 
Equations (35), (36) and (37) constitute a recursive dynamic system: the capital-labor ratio is always at 
the steady-state level and (36) governs the dynamics of the government's fiscal position. Equation (37) indicates 
how the net investment abroad inherits its dynamics from the dynamics of the government's fiscal position. 
A local stability analysis gives the following results. Equation (36) is a first order linear difference 












￿ - > " e s s , 1
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r
Max .  The government's fiscal position is stable and dynamic paths approaching the 
steady-state do so monotonically.  Equation (37) implies that cross-border capital flows will  also display 
monotonic dynamics. 
How does this compare with the dynamics obtained under a policy of floating with a constant rate of 
money growth? In a Walrasian regime, the difference between these two alternative monetary targets seems to 
lay in the speed of convergence to the steady-state equilibrium, since fluctuations are never observed. A policy 
of inflation targeting seems to take longer to reach the steady-state equilibrium when credit is not rationed. 
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5.2  Dynamic Systems in a Credit Rationing Regime 
In this section, I consider equilibrium dynamics in a Credit Rationing Regime. I will show that the dynamic 
properties of equilibria are substantially different depending upon the target variable chosen by the Central 
Bank. 
5.2.1 Credit rationing dynamics when floating with a constant rate of money growth 
The credit rationing dynamic system under a policy of a constant rate of money growth is given by (14) as an 
equality and (15). (13) holds as an inequality. In an unpublished appendix I present the derivations of the results 
presented below. 
Case 1: In a Case 1 Economy, two possibilities may arise: 
Case 1.1 When  [ ] 0 ) 1 )( 1 ( > + - - a l ap r , the steady state is a saddle with a negative stable eigenvalue. 
Dynamic equilibria are determinate and damped oscillations will be observed along the stable manifold. 
Case 1.2 When [ ] 0 ) 1 )( 1 ( < + - - a l ap r  , the following is possible: 
a) When x is relatively large. 
a.1) For low values of s, the steady state is a saddle with a negative stable eigenvalue, and 
dynamic equilibria are determinate. Again, damped oscillations will be observed  along the 
stable manifold. 
a.2) For high values of s, the steady state is a source. 
b) When x is relatively small, the steady state is always a source. 
Case 2:  ) 1 )( 1 ( a l ap - - < r  In a Case 2 Economy there are the following possibilities: 
2.1) When x is relatively large, the steady state is a saddle with a positive stable eigenvalue. Equilibria are 
determinate and no fluctuations will be observed along the stable manifold. 
2.2)  When x is relatively small, the following is possible: 
a) For low values of  s,  the steady state is a sink and dynamic paths approach the steady state 
monotonically. Dynamic equilibria are indeterminate.   25 
b) As the domestic rate of money creation increases, the steady state is again a sink, but dynamic paths 
approaching the steady-state exhibit damped oscillations. Hence, dynamic equilibria are indeterminate 
and display cyclical fluctuations. 
c) For high values of s, the steady state becomes a saddle with a positive stable eigenvalue. Equilibria 
are determinate, and no fluctuations will be observed along the stable manifold. 
Equilibrium Dynamics and Volatility. When an economy like the one described in this paper has a policy of 
floating with a constant rate of money growth, there will be endogenously arising volatility in output, the price 
level, and net investment abroad. Along dynamic equilibrium paths, all of these variables will fluctuate, even in 
the absence of exogenous shocks. Thus, when credit is rationed, a policy of floating exchange rates coupled with 
a constant rate of money creation need not imply the short-run existence of a relatively stable rate of inflation. In 
addition, the presence of credit rationing and the possibility of associated endogenous volatility can help to 
explain why net foreign investment tends to be very volatile relative to observed changes in obvious exogenous 
variables. 
5.2.2 Credit rationing dynamics with inflation targeting 
The properties of dynamic equilibria near the nontrivial steady state when credit is rationed differ according to 
whether a Case 1 economy or a Case 2 economy is being considered. 
Case 1: When Case 1 occurs, three cases are possible. 
Case 1.1: When x is large enough, the nontrivial steady-state is a saddle with positive eigenvalues for all levels 
of inflation. Dynamic equilibria are determinate and no fluctuations are observed along the stable manifold. The 
stable eigenvalue is decreasing in s. 
Case 1.2: When x takes a medium value, it is possible to observe that: 
a) F or low values of  s, the nontrivial steady-state is a saddle with positive eigenvalues. Dynamic 
equilibria are determinate and no fluctuations are observed along the stable manifold. Again, the stable 
eigenvalue is decreasing in s.   26 
b) For high values of s, the nontrivial steady-state is still a saddle, but the eigenvalues have opposite 
signs. However, the stable eigenvalue is positive and no fluctuations will be observed along the stable 
manifold. Again, the stable eigenvalue is decreasing in s. 
Case 1.3:  When x is low enough, the nontrivial steady-state is a sink and the eigenvalues have opposite signs. 
As a consequence, dynamic equilibria are indeterminate and fluctuations can be observed.  In this case 
endogenously arising volatility may be present in the economy. 
Case 2: In a Case 2 economy, the nontrivial steady-state is always a sink with positive eigenvalues. Dynamic 
equilibria are stable, indeterminate and no fluctuations will be observed. 
Equilibrium Dynamics and Volatility. When the Central Banks follows a policy of floating with inflation 
targeting, the possibility of endogenously arising short-run fluctuations in the inflation rate is eliminated. For the 
cases considered here, a policy of inflation targeting  also  reduces the scope of fluctuations in output, the 
government position and saving abroad. In most cases, the scope for stable dynamic equilibria increases with a 
policy of inflation targeting. 
The elimination of or the reduction of the scope for endogenous economic fluctuations are associated with a 
policy of inflation targeting in the environment studied in this paper. These results can help us understand better 
the empirical evidence showing that a large number of emerging market economies are moving towards a policy 
of floating exchange rate regimes with inflation targeting. 
 
6  Conclusions 
This paper presents a model of a small open economy that shares several characteristics of most of the Latin 
American economies during the 1990s. In this economy, financial intermediaries perform a real allocative 
function in the presence of multiple (and binding) reserve requirements and an adverse selection problem in 
credit markets. The severity of this friction in credit markets is endogenous and, thus, financial intermediaries 
may or may not need to ration credit in order to induce self-selection. The rate of inflation has a very strong 
effect on the extent to which credit is rationed, and therefore, the ability of the monetary authority to achieve   27 
low and stable inflation is of the utmost importance. I consider the relative merits of alternative monetary targets 
under a floating exchange rate regime. In particular, I compare a policy of inflation targeting with a policy of a 
constant money growth. The comparisons are made in the following dimensions: the successful achievement of 
low and stable inflation rates, the promotion of financial deepening and the ability to avoid stagnation in output. 
I find that changes in domestic and world (U.S.) inflation affect the domestic capital stock differently 
according to whether  or not  credit is rationed, through the channel of the s elf-selection constraint.  Credit 
rationing either tends to be observed when domestic rates of inflation are low, or else the scope for credit to be 
rationed depends in a relatively complicated way on the target for domestic inflation. The first situation will 
emerge when the probability of repaying a loan for a dissembling Type 1 agent is relatively high while the 
second will arise when the probability of repayment is sufficiently low. Steady-state equilibria under a policy of 
floating exchange rates with inflation targeting are identical to the corresponding equilibria under a constant rate 
of money growth, whether credit is rationed or not. 
In situations where the probability of repaying loans is high, moderate increases in the inflation target 
(which is equal to rate of money growth and to the inflation rate in the steady-state) stimulate output and lead to 
financial deepening when credit is rationed (inflation is initially low), but reduce output and financial depth 
when there is no credit rationing (inflation is initially high). Thus, there will be inflation thresholds as observed 
empirically
31, 
32: inflation and output are positively (negatively) correlated below (above) the threshold. As a 
result, domestic inflation can be used to stimulate output –which cannot be done under a fixed exchange rate 
regime, because domestic and foreign inflation must be equal-, but there is a strict limit on this ability due to the 
presence of the inflation threshold. In situations where the probability of repaying loans is low, increases in 
inflation are always detrimental to growth and no thresholds are observed. 
When equilibrium dynamics are considered, I find that two cases  arise,  depending upon the 
fundamentals of the economy. In the first case, the probability of repaying loans is high. In this situation and 
                                                 
31 See Bullard and Keating (1995), Khan and Senhadji (2001), and Drukker, Gomis-Porqueras and Hernandez-Verme 
(2005). 
32 See Hernandez-Verme (2003)   28 
with credit rationed, a policy of inflation targeting seems to increase the scope for stability and indeterminacy 
but to reduce the potential for economic fluctuations, relative to a policy of constant money growth. The second 
case arises when the probability of repaying loans is low. In this case, when credit is rationed, dynamic 
equilibria are indeterminate but no economic fluctuations are observed. When compared to a policy of  a 
constant rate of floating with money growth, a policy of inflation targeting seems to typically reduce the scope 
for economic fluctuations. 
It is then possible to argue that for a small open economy like the one presented in this paper, a policy of 
inflation targeting will typically reduce the scope for economic fluctuations, compared to a policy of floating 
with constant money growth. However, the potential of this policy to improve on the stability and/or 
determinacy of dynamic equilibria on variables other than the inflation rate seems to depend strongly on one of 
the fundamentals of this economy: the probability of repaying loans. Future research would attempt to build a 
link between this probability and the information that may be regularly available to a policy maker, like, for 
example, the state of the economy. This may also offer some additional guidance for the task of choosing the 
target for domestic inflation. 
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I. Alternative Fiscal Policies 
 
1  Alternative Policy 1: To Give Equal Lump-Sum Transfers to all Young Agents 
If all agents receive the same lump-sum transfer of tt goods, independently of type, the (binding) self-selection 
constraint becomes 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) { } t t t t t t b x k f x k f r k rw p r p t p p - + - = - - - + + + 1 1 1
'
1
'     (A.1) 
A policy will be neutral in this environment if the policy does not affect the self-selection constraint or, 
equivalently, if the resulting transfer of goods does not appear in the self-selection constraint (C.1). In this 
particular case, the Alternative Policy 1 is neutral if and only if  ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 1 1
' = - - - + x k f r t p p  because only in 
this case does any nontrivial value of tt not appear in the self-selection constraint (A.1). However, there is a 
unique capital stock k
(
 that ensures that  ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 1
' = - - - x k f r p p
(
. It is easy to show that 

















 constant  (A.2) 
Therefore,  ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 1 1
' = - - - + x k f r t p p  only under very special circumstances, when, by coincidence, 
k kt
(
= +1 . As a result, the Alternative Policy 1 is not neutral because it does affect the self-selection constraint. 
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2  Alternative Fiscal Policy 2: To Give Transfers Specific to Young Agents of Each Type so that the 
Policy is Neutral 
Under this policy, young Type 1 agents receive t1t goods and young Type 2 agents receive t2t goods. t1t and t2t 
are set by the monetary authority so that the self-selection constraint is not affected. Under the Alternative 
Policy 2, the self-selection constraint becomes 




1   (A.3) 
The Alternative Policy 2 is defined so that is neutral, in the sense that the self-selection constraint is not 





















+   (A.4) 
and (A.3) becomes 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) { } t t t t b x k f k rw p r p - + - = + + 1 1
'   (A.5) 
Thus, the Alternative Policy 2 is neutral because it does not affect the self-selection constraint. 
From (A.3) it is possible to appreciate that the Alternative Policy 2 seems to be highly sophisticated. In 
addition, due to the presence of private information, it would be hard for the monetary authority to distinguish 
between young Type 1 agents and young Type 2 agents. Thus, the Alternative Policy 2 does not seem to be a 
credible policy when it comes to implementation. 
 
 
II. Equilibrium Dynamics with Credit Rationing 
 
1  A Constant Rate of Money Growth 
In Hernandez-Verme (2003), I show the following properties of equilibrium dynamics. Let T and D denote, 
respectively, the trace and the determinant of the Jacobian of the system. Notice that D<0 for all values of s 
associated with a positive marginal product of capital. As a result, both eigenvalues will be real and distinct, and 
they will have opposite signs. 
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Max . However, 
it is possible for  [ ] ) 1 )( 1 ( a l ap + - - r  to be either positive or negative, and therefore, the properties of 
1+T+D will change accordingly.   31 
Case 1.1 When [ ] 0 ) 1 )( 1 ( > + - - a l ap r , 1+T+D>0>1-T+D, "s. The steady state is a saddle with a 
negative stable eigenvalue. Dynamic equilibria are determinate and damped oscillations will be observed along 
the stable manifold. 
Case 1.2 When [ ] 0 ) 1 )( 1 ( < + - - a l ap r , 1+T+D is monotonically decreasing in s. It is possible that 
1+T+D>0 holds for low values of s whereas 1+T+D<0 holds as s increases. Or it is possible that 1+T+D<0 
holds for all the values of s within the range considered. In what follows, I consider both possibilities. 
a) 1+T+D>(<)0 for low (high) values of s. This situation transpires when x is relatively large. 
a.1) For low values of  s,  1+T+D>0>1-T+D. The steady state is a saddle with a negative stable 
eigenvalue, and dynamic equilibria are determinate. Again, damped oscillations will be observed along the 
stable manifold. 
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Max . This situation transpires when x is relatively small, and the 
steady state is always a source. 
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Max .  As 
previously observed, it is possible that either 1+T+D>(<)0 for low (high) values of s, or 1+T+D<0 could hold 
for all the values of s within the range considered (when x is relatively large). 
Whenever 1+T+D changes sign from positive to negative as s increases, it is possible to observe the 
following: 
a) For low values of s, 1+T+D>1-T+D>0 and |D|<1. The steady state is a sink and dynamic paths 
approach the steady state monotonically. Dynamic equilibria are indeterminate. 
b) As the domestic rate of money creation increases, 0<1+T+D<1-T+D and |D|<1. The steady state is 
again a sink, but dynamic paths approaching the steady-state exhibit damped oscillations. Dynamic equilibria 
are indeterminate and display cyclical fluctuations. 
c) For high values of s, 1-T+D>0 and 1+T+D<0. The steady state becomes a saddle with a positive 
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Max , the steady state is always a saddle with a 
positive stable eigenvalue. 
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2  Credit rationing dynamics when floating with inflation targeting 
The dynamic system under credit rationing can be rewritten as 
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a a   (A.7) 
t t q t = +1   (A.8) 
and 
( ) t t k f r > ¢ +1   (A.9) 
The Jacobian of the linearized system is 
( ) ,
0 1 0











































q k J t  (A.10) 
where 
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It is easy to show that the determinant of  ( ) q k J ~ , ~ ,
~
t  is equal to zero. Therefore, one of the eigenvalues 



























l l l H 1 3 2 1 2   (A.16) 
Thus, the remaining two eigenvalues are given by the roots h of the following quadratic equation: 
. 0 2 1
2 = - - H H h h   (A.17) 
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It can be shown that 
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The properties of dynamic equilibria near the nontrivial steady state when credit is rationed differ 
according to whether a Case 1 economy or a Case 2 economy is being considered.  Different parameter 
configurations
33 may imply that dynamic equilibria have different properties. Specifically, notice that it is 
always the case that  ( ) 0 > s a  and that [(1-ff)(1-p)x-(1-fd-ff)pr] is decreasing in s, but the properties of  ( ) s b  
may differ according to whether Case 1 or Case 2 arises. In what follows I describe the dynamic properties of 
the system under Case 1 and Case 2. 
                                                 
33 Specifically, different magnitudes of p , the probability of a Type 1 agent actually repaying a loan if it is taken.   34 
Case 1:  ) 1 )( 1 ( a l ap - - > r . When Case 1 occurs, it must be the case that [(1-ff)(1-p)x-(1-fd-ff)pr]<0, for 
( ) k f
~ '  to be well defined. Recall that  ( ) k f
~ '  is decreasing in s. Thus,  ( ) s b  is a decreasing function of s in a 
Case 1 economy. I am able to determine, analytically, that three cases may arise. 
Case 1.1:  ( ) e s s s > " >   , 0 b . This case is in general associated with values of  x large enough and/or values of 
l  small enough, provided that the probability of repaying loans is still high enough. Under these circumstances, 
the nontrivial steady-state is a saddle with positive eigenvalues for all levels of inflation. Dynamic equilibria are 
determinate and no fluctuations are observed along the stable manifold. The stable eigenvalue is decreasing in s. 
Case 1.2: Let  s  to be such that  ( ) 0 = s b . For medium values of  x and  l , it is possible to observe that 
( ) ( ) ( ) s s s s s s s e > < ˛ >   if   0   and   ,   if   , 0 b b . When these conditions hold, for low values of  s, i.e., 
( ) s s s e , ˛ , the nontrivial steady-state is a saddle with positive eigenvalues.  Dynamic equilibria are 
determinate and no fluctuations are observed along the stable manifold. Again, the stable eigenvalue is 
decreasing in s. 
For high values of s, i.e., for  s s > , the nontrivial steady-state is still a saddle, but the eigenvalues 
have opposite signs. The stable eigenvalue is positive and no fluctuations will be observed along the stable 
manifold. Again, the stable eigenvalue is decreasing in s. 
Case 1.3:  ( ) e s s s > " <   , 0 b  . This case is associated with low values of  x and high values of l . In this case, 
the nontrivial steady-state is a sink and  the eigenvalues have opposite signs. As a consequence, dynamic 
equilibria are indeterminate and fluctuations can be observed. In this case endogenously arising volatility may 
be present in the economy. 
Case 2:  ) 1 )( 1 ( a l ap - - < r . In a Case 2 economy, it must be the case that [(1-ff)(1-p)x-(1-fd-ff)pr]>0, for 
( ) k f
~ '  to be well defined. Recall that  ( ) k f
~ '  is increasing in s. Thus, it is always the case that  ( ) 0 > s b  in a 
Case 2 economy. The nontrivial steady-state is always a sink with positive eigenvalues. Dynamic equilibria are 
stable, indeterminate and no fluctuations will be observed.   35 
 
Table 1: Endowments and access to technologies 
  Type 1  Type 2 
Young  •  1 unit of labor. 
Investment technology: 
• With probability  p: 1 good at  t 
yields 1 unit of capital at t+1. 
    w/ prob. (1-p): 1 good at tﬁ0 units 
of capital at t+1. 
 
•  Storage technology. 
•  No labor. 
Investment technology: 
•  With certainty: 1 good at t yields 1 
unit of capital at t+1. 
 
 
•  No storage technology. 
Old  •  No labor. 
•  If she receives capital, she 
produces F(K,N) goods. 
•  1 unit of labor. Works for herself. 
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Figure 2b  37 
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Figure 2c